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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the integration of regions and nations through the prism of the merger 
of populations (societies). The paper employs a particular index of social stress. Stylized 
examples of the merging of two populations suggest that with integration, the social 
stress index will increase. The examples form the basis for the development of new 
formulas for calculating the social stress of an integrated population as a function of the 
levels of social stress of the constituent populations when apart. The formulas reveal that 
the social stress of an integrated population is higher than the sum of the levels of social 
stress of the constituent populations when apart. This raises the distinct possibility that 
the merging of populations may be a social liability: integration may fail to give the 
populace a sense of improved wellbeing.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we look at the integration of regions and nations through a somewhat 
unusual prism. In what follows we do not strive to provide a balance sheet of the 
advantages and disadvantages of integration which, undoubtedly, include various 
efficiency and productivity gains. Rather, we seek to highlight a particular worrisome 
aspect of integration.  
Integration and mergers of populations occur in various spheres of life. They may 
arise naturally or as a result of administrative considerations, they may be imposed or 
chosen. Conquests bring hitherto disparate populations into one, provinces consolidate 
into regions, small municipalities merge into a larger municipality (as is currently 
happening increasingly in Italy), adjacent villages that experience population growth 
coalesce into one town, schools and school classes are joined, firms concentrate 
production from two plants in one, branches of a bank amalgamate, East Germany and 
West Germany become united Germany, European countries integrate financially 
(adopting a common currency) and otherwise.  
In general, when two populations merge, a variety of benefits are anticipated: 
denser markets, increased efficiency and productivity brought about by scale effects, and 
the like. Classical trade theory maintains that integration liberalizes trade and smoothes 
labor and financial flows. Larger markets improve resource allocation and the distribution 
of final products. The welfare of the integrating populations is bound to rise. Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer (1991) emphasize the influence of integration on the prevailing stock of 
knowledge and on the speed of technological advances, and van Elkan (1996) points to 
the role of integration in narrowing the technological gap between countries, which 
stimulates growth. Henrekson et al. (1997), who address the long-run growth effect of 
European integration, point to a particularly beneficial effect of integration.  
The picture may not be so bright, however. Convergence in the income levels of the 
integrating countries or regions is not by any means inevitable. Behrens et al. (2007) 
show that to secure gains from integration, a significant degree of coordination of policies 
between countries is required, while Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1993), and Zeng and Zhao 
(2010) caution that the income inequality repercussions of integration may well depend 
on the characteristics of the countries or regions involved, which, when unfavorable, can 
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result in increased inequality in the integrated population. Beckfield (2009), who studies 
European integration and individual levels of income, reports reduced between-country 
income inequality but increased within-country income inequality. The inconclusiveness 
of these outcomes also pervades research on firms: whereas Qiu and Zhou (2006) report 
increased profitability following the international merger of firms, Greenaway et al. 
(2008) point to a greater likelihood of a closedown when a firm faces tighter competition 
in a liberalized market. An interesting strand of literature deals with the merger of firms 
and workplaces, employing “social identity theory” (originally developed by Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). A recurrent finding (cf. Terry et al., 2001; Terry and O’Brien, 2001; 
Fischer et al., 2007) is that different groups of individuals have contrasting perceptions: a 
merger is viewed most negatively by those of low status, whereas high status people are 
more at ease with the merged structure. This finding connects with one of the main 
claims of the current paper: when such contrasting perceptions are aggregated, belonging 
to a larger society results in a heightened level of social stress.  
In this paper we employ a particular index of social stress, namely total relative 
deprivation, TRD, to assess the repercussions of a merger. In Sections 2, 3, and 4 we 
present the background, rationale, and logic for this index. In Section 5 we review 
stylized representations of mergers. We show that in each of two non-trivial scenarios, 
the index registers an increase. In Section 6 and 7 we develop new procedures for 
calculating the TRD of a merged population as a function of the TRDs of the constituent 
populations when apart. Building on these procedures we show that in a rich variety of 
settings, the TRD of a merged population is greater than the sum of the TRDs of the 
constituent populations when apart. Taking these steps raises the disturbing possibility, 
alluded to in Section 8, that, in and by itself, integration (for example, European 
monetary integration) may fail to reward the populace with a sense of improved 
wellbeing. In Section 9 we briefly conclude.  
 
2. A measure of social stress  
Consider a population N of n  individuals whose incomes are 1 2 ... nyy y≤ ≤ ≤ , where 
2n ≥ . We measure the stress of an individual by relative deprivation, RD, which for an 
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individual i who earns income iy , where 1,..., 1i n= − , and who refers to population N as 
his comparison group, is defined as  
 ( )
1
1( ) ,
n
N i k
k i
iRD y y yn = +
≡ −∑  (1) 
and it is understood that ( ) 0N nRD y = .  
The total relative deprivation of population N, TRDN, is naturally the sum of the 
levels of relative deprivation of the individuals who belong to this population, 
 
1
1 1 1
1( ) ( )
n n n
N N i k i
i i k i
TRD RD y y y
n
−
= = = +
= = −∑ ∑∑ . (2) 
We resort to TRD as a measure of social stress of a population. In the next two sections 
we provide a brief account of the manner in which relative deprivation gained a foothold 
in economic analysis, and we explain in some detail how the measure of relative 
deprivation given in (1) is constructed.   
 
3. A brief history of relative deprivation in economics 
Considerable economic analysis has been inspired by the sociological-psychological 
concepts of RD and reference groups. Economists have come to consider these concepts 
as fitting tools for studying comparisons that affect an individual’s behavior, in particular, 
comparisons with related individuals whose incomes are higher than his own income (cf. 
the large literature spanning from Duesenberry, 1949, to, for example, Clark et al., 2008). 
An individual has an unpleasant sense of being relatively deprived when he lacks a 
desired good and perceives that others in his reference group possess that good 
(Runciman, 1966).1 Given the income distribution of the individual’s reference group, the 
individual’s RD is the sum of the deprivation caused by every income unit that he lacks 
(Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey and Lambert, 1980; Ebert and Moyes, 2000; Bossert and 
D’Ambrosio, 2006; Stark and Hyll, 2011). 
The pioneering study in modern times that opened the flood-gate to research on RD 
and primary (reference) groups is the 1949 two-volume set of Stouffer et al. Studies in 
                                               
1 In Runciman’s (1966) theory of RD, an individual’s reference group is the group of individuals with 
whom the individual compares himself (cf. Singer, 1981). 
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Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier. That work documented the 
distress caused not by a given low military rank and weak prospects of promotion 
(military police) but rather by the pace of promotion of others (air force). It also 
documented the lesser dissatisfaction of black soldiers stationed in the South who 
compared themselves with black civilians in the South than the dissatisfaction of their 
counterparts stationed in the North who compared themselves with black civilians in the 
North. Stouffer’s research was followed by a large social-psychological literature. 
Economics has caught up relatively late, and only somewhat. This is rather surprising 
because eminent economists in the past understood well that people compare themselves 
to others around them, and that social comparisons are of paramount importance for 
individuals’ happiness, motivation, and actions. Even Adam Smith (1776) pointed to the 
social aspects of the necessities of life, and stressed the relative nature of poverty: “A 
linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and 
Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present 
times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-laborer would be ashamed to 
appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote 
that disgraceful degree of poverty […]” (p. 465). Marx’s (1849) observations that “Our 
wants and pleasures have their origin in the society; [… and] they are of a relative nature” 
(p. 33) emphasize the social nature of utility, and the impact of an individual’s relative 
position on his satisfaction. Inter alia, Marx wrote: “A house may be large or small; as 
long as the surrounding houses are equally small, it satisfies all social demands for a 
dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, the house shrinks into a hut” (p. 
33). Samuelson (1973), one of the founders of modern neoclassical economics, pointed 
out that an individual’s utility does not depend only on what he consumes in absolute 
terms: “Because man is a social animal, what he regards as ‘necessary comforts of life’ 
depends on what he sees others consuming” (p. 218). 
The relative income hypothesis, formulated by Duesenberry (1949), posits an 
asymmetry in the comparisons of income which affect the individual’s behavior: the 
individual looks upward when making comparisons. Veblen’s (1899) concept of 
pecuniary emulation explains why the behavior of an individual can be influenced by 
comparisons with the incomes of those who are richer. Because income determines the 
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level of consumption, higher income levels may be the focus for emulation. Thus, an 
individual’s income aspirations (to obtain the income levels of other individuals whose 
incomes are higher than his own) are shaped by the perceived consumption standards of 
the richer. In that way, invidious comparisons affect behavior, that is, behavior which 
leads to “the achievement of a favourable comparison with other men [...]” (Veblen, 
1899, p. 33).2  
 
4. The rationale and construction of a measure of social stress  
Several recent insightful studies in social psychology (for example, Callan et al., 2011; 
Smith et al., 2012) document how sensing RD impacts negatively on personal wellbeing, 
but these studies do not provide a calibrating procedure; a sign is not a magnitude. For 
the purpose of constructing a measure, a natural starting point is the work of Runciman 
(1966), who, as already noted in the preceding section, argued that an individual has an 
unpleasant sense of being relatively deprived when he lacks a desired good and perceives 
that others with whom he naturally compares himself possess that good. Runciman (1966, 
p. 19) writes as follows: “The more people a man sees promoted when he is not promoted 
himself, the more people he may compare himself with in a situation where the 
comparison will make him feel deprived,” thus implying that the deprivation from not 
having, say, income y is an increasing function of the fraction of people in the 
individual’s reference group who have y. To aid intuition and for the sake of 
concreteness, we resort to income-based comparisons, namely an individual feels 
relatively deprived when others in his comparison group earn more than he does. An 
implicit assumption here is that the earnings of others are publicly known. Alternatively, 
we can think of consumption, which could be more publicly visible than income, 
although these two variables can reasonably be assumed to be strongly positively 
correlated.  
                                               
2 The empirical findings support the relative income hypothesis. Duesenberry (1949) found that 
individuals’ savings rates depend on their positions in the income distribution, and that the incomes of the 
richer people affect the behavior of the poorer ones (but not vice versa). Schor (1998) showed that, keeping 
annual and permanent income constant, individuals whose incomes are lower than the incomes of others in 
their community save significantly less than those who are relatively better off in their community.  
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As an illustration of the relationship between the fraction of people possessing 
income y and the deprivation of an individual lacking y, consider a population (reference 
group) of six individuals with incomes {1,2,6,6,6,8}. Imagine a furniture store that in 
three distinct compartments sells chairs, armchairs, and sofas. An income of 2 allows you 
to buy a chair. To be able to buy any armchair, you need an income that is a little bit 
higher than 2. To buy any sofa, you need an income that is a little bit higher than 6. Thus, 
when you go to the store and your income is 2, what are you “deprived of?” The answer 
is “of armchairs,” and “of sofas.” Mathematically, this deprivation can be represented by 
( 2)(6 2) ( 6)(8 6)P Y P Y> − + > − , where ( )iP Y y>  stands for the fraction of those in the 
population whose income is higher than iy , for 2,6iy = . The reason for this 
representation is that when you have an income of 2, you cannot afford anything in the 
compartment that sells armchairs, and you cannot afford anything in the compartment 
that sells sofas. Because not all those who are to your right in the ascendingly ordered 
income distribution can afford to buy a sofa, yet they can all afford to buy armchairs, a 
breakdown into the two (weighted) terms ( 2)(6 2)P Y > −  and ( 6)(8 6)P Y > −  is needed. 
This way, we get to the very essence of the measure of RD used in much of this paper: we 
take into account the fraction of the comparison group (population) who possess some 
good which you do not, and we weigh this fraction by the “excess value” of that good. 
Because income enables an individual to afford the consumption of certain goods, we 
refer to comparisons based on income. 
Formally, let 1( ,..., )my y y=  be the vector of incomes in population N of size n with 
relative incidences ( )p y = ( )1( ),..., ( )mp y p y , where m n≤  is the number of distinct 
income levels in y. The RD of an individual earning iy  is defined as the weighted sum of 
the excesses of incomes higher than iy  such that each excess is weighted by its relative 
incidence, namely  
                                               ( ) ( )( )
k i
N i k k i
y y
RD y p y y y
>
≡ −∑ .                                         (3) 
In the example given above with income distribution {1,2,6,6,6,8}, we have that the 
vector of incomes is (1,2,6,8)y = , and that the corresponding relative incidences are 
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1 1 3 1( ) ( , , , )
6 6 6 6
p y = . Therefore, the RD of the individual earning 2 is 
( )( ) (6)(6 2) (8)(8 2)
k i
k k i
y y
p y y y p p
>
− = − + −∑  
3 14 6 3
6 6
= + = . By similar calculations, we 
have that the RD of the individual earning 1 is higher at 53
6
, and that the RD of each of 
the individuals earning 6 is lower at 1
3
 . 
We expand the vector y  to include incomes with their possible respective 
repetitions, that is, we include each iy  as many times as its incidence dictates, and we 
assume that the incomes are ordered, that is, 1( ,..., )ny y y=  such that 1 2 ... nyy y≤ ≤ ≤ . In 
this case, the relative incidence of each iy , ( )ip y , is 1/ n , and, (3), defined for 
1,..., 1i n= − , becomes just as given in (1) 
( )
1
1( ) .
n
N i k
k i
iRD y y yn = +
≡ −∑  
Looking at incomes in a large population, we can model the distribution of incomes 
as a random variable Y over the domain [0, )∞  with a cumulative distribution function F. 
We can then express the RD of an individual earning iy  as  
                                          ( ) [ ] ( )1 ( ) |N i i i iRD y F y E Y y Y y= − − > .                                  (4) 
To obtain this expression, starting from (3), we have that 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )[1 ( )] [1 ( )]
1 ( )
[1 ( )] ( | ) [1 ( )]
[1 ( )] ( | ).
k i
ik k i
ik
N i k k i
y y
k k k
y y y y
k k
i i i
y y i
i i i i
i i i
i
RD y p y y y
p y y y p y
p y yF y y F y
F y
F y E Y Y y F y y
F y E Y y Y y
>
> >
>
≡ −
= −
= − − −
−
= − > − −
= − − >
∑
∑ ∑
∑  
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The formula in (4) states that the RD of an individual whose income is iy  is equal to the 
product of two terms: ( )1 iF y− , which is the fraction of those individuals in the 
population of n  individuals whose incomes are higher than iy , and ( | )i iE Y y Y y− > , 
which is the mean excess income.  
The formula in (4) is quite revealing because it casts RD in a richer light than the 
ordinal measure of rank or, for that matter, even the ordinal measure of status, which 
have been studied intensively in sociology and beyond. The formula informs us that when 
the income of individual A is, say, 10, and that of individual B is, say, 16, the RD of 
individual A is higher than when the income of individual B is 15, even though, in both 
cases, the rank of individual A in the income hierarchy is second. The formula also 
informs us that more RD is sensed by an individual whose income is 10 when the income 
of another is 14 (RD is 2) than when the income of each of four others is 11 (RD is 4
5
), 
even though the excess income in both cases is 4. This property aligns nicely with 
intuition: it is more painful (more stress is experienced) when the income of half of the 
population in question is 40 percent higher, than when the income of 4
5
 of the population 
is 10 percent higher. In addition, the formula in (4) reveals that even though RD is sensed 
by looking to the right of the income distribution, it is impacted by events taking place on 
the left of the income distribution. For example, an exit from the population of a low-
income individual increases the RD of higher-income individuals (other than the richest) 
because the weight that the latter attach to the difference between the incomes of 
individuals “richer” than themselves and their own income rises. The often cited example 
from a three tenors concert organized for Wembley Stadium in which Pavarotti reputedly 
did not care how much he was paid so long as it was one pound more than Domingo was 
paid does not invalidate the logic behind our measure because, in light of the measure, 
Pavarotti’s payment request can be interpreted as being aimed at ensuring that no RD will 
be experienced when he looks to the right in the pay distribution.  
Similar reasoning can explain the demand for positional goods (Hirsch, 1976). The 
standard explanation is that this demand arises from the unique value of positional goods 
in elevating the social status of their owners (“These goods [are] sought after because 
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they compare favorably with others in their class.” Frank, 1985, p. 7). The distaste for 
relative deprivation offers another explanation: by acquiring a positional good, an 
individual shields himself from being leapfrogged by others which, if that were to 
happen, would expose him to RD. Seen this way, a positional good is a form of insurance 
against experiencing RD. 
There can, of course, be other, quite intuitive ways of gauging RD, and in some 
contexts and for some applications, a measure simpler than (1) can be adequate. Suppose 
that an individual’s income is I, and the average income of the individual’s reference 
group is R. We can then define RD as a function of I and R, namely 
 
if
( , )
0   if .
R I I R
RD I R
I R
− <"
= #
≥%
 (5) 
This representation captures the intuitive requirements 
( ) ( ), ,0,  0  for RD I R RD I R R I
I R
∂ ∂
< > >
∂ ∂
, 
namely that, holding other things the same, for a relatively deprived individual (that is, 
for an individual whose income is lower than the average income of the individual’s 
reference group), RD decreases with his own income, and increases with the average 
income of his reference group. Examples of the use of (5) are in Fan and Stark (2007), 
Stark and Fan (2011), and Stark and Jakubek (2013). However, the advantage of using 
(1) is that it is based on an axiomatic foundation which is, essentially, a translation of 
Runciman’s (1966) work, let alone that it is nice in economics to draw on a foundation 
laid out in social psychology. 
The formula in (4) that the RD of an individual is equal to the product of the 
fraction of those in the population whose incomes are higher than his and the mean 
excess income, was derived for income as a discrete variable. For the sake of 
completeness, we note that the formula applies just as well to income considered as a 
continuous variable. To see this, let  
( ) ( )
y
F y f t dt
−∞
= ∫ . 
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Because                  
( )( )
1 ( )
f xf x x y
F y
> =
−
, 
it follows that 
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) [1 ( )] ( ).
y y
f x x dx F y f x x y xdx F y E x x y
∞ ∞
= − > = − >∫ ∫  
Thus,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[1 ( )] ( ) ( ) .
y y y
y
RD y f x x y dx f x x dx f x y dx
F y E x x y y f x dx
∞ ∞ ∞
∞
≡ − = + −
= − > −
∫ ∫ ∫
∫
 
Because  
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] [1 ( )]
y
y
y f x dx y f x dx f x dx y F y
∞ ∞
−∞ −∞
− = − − = − −∫ ∫ ∫ , 
we get that    
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) [1 ( )]
[1 ( )] ( ).
 
y
RD y F y E x x y y f x dx F y E x x y y F y
F y E x y x y
∞
= − > − = − > − −
= − − >
∫
 
We now move from a theoretical background account to consider several specific 
income distributions and to assess how a merger impacts on the relative deprivation 
experienced by the integrated population. 
 
5. Three scenarios for the mergers of populations 
5.1 Scenario 1: a merger of two identical populations 
For the sake of ease of reference, we will use a slightly different notation of the income 
distribution of a population. Let there be two populations, A  and B , with income 
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distributions {1,2},AI  and {1,2}.BI  Then, 
1{1,2} {1,2} .
2A B
TRD TRD= =  Let the two 
populations merge. The income distribution of the merged population is {1,1,2,2}A BI ∪ . 
Summing over the post-merger RD of the individuals, we get that 2 2 1.
4 4A B
TRD ∪ = + =  
Each of the two individuals whose income is 1 continues to experience exactly the same 
level of relative deprivation as prior to the merger, and the TRD of the merged population 
is twice what it was in each of the constituent populations when apart. Notably, the act of 
merging results in concentrating in one population the relative deprivation that was 
distributed between the constituent populations prior to the merger.  
 
5.2 Scenario 2: merger of two different populations whose income distributions do 
not overlap 
Let there be two populations, a relatively poor population C with income distribution 
{1,2} CI , and a relatively rich population D with income distribution {4,4}.  DI Then, 
1{1,2}
2C
TRD = , and {4,4} 0DTRD = . Let the two populations merge. The income 
distribution of the merged population is {1,2,4,4}C DI ∪ . Summing over the post-merger RD 
of the individuals, we get that 7 4 11
4 4 4C D
TRD ∪ = + = ; the TRD of the merged population is 
five and a half times what it was in the constituent population C, and infinite times what 
it was in the constituent population D. The TRD of the merged population is higher than 
the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations when apart.  
 
5.3 Scenario 3: merger of two different populations whose income distributions 
overlap  
Let there be two populations, population G with income distribution {1,6}GI , and 
population H with income distribution {4,5}HI , namely the income distribution of H is 
“immersed” en block in the income distribution of G. Then, 5{1,6}
2G
TRD = , and 
1{4,5}
2H
TRD = . The merger of G and H yields income distribution {1,4,5,6}G HI ∪ . 
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Summing over the post-merger RD of the individuals, we get that 
12 3 1 4
4 4 4G H
TRD ∪ = + + = ; the TRD of the merged population is three fifths higher than 
what it was in the constituent population G, and eight times higher than it was in the 
constituent population H. The TRD of the merged population is higher than the sum of 
the TRDs of the constituent populations when apart.3 
 
6. Calculating the TRD of a merged population as a function of the TRDs of the 
constituent populations  
6.1 The TRD when non-overlapping populations merge 
Let there be two populations, M and N, and let there be m  individuals in population M, 
and n  individuals in population N. We denote the total relative deprivation of each of 
these two populations when apart by MTRD  and NTRD , respectively. Let the incomes of 
the individuals in M be 1 2 ... mx x x≤ ≤ ≤ , and let the incomes of the individuals in N be 
1 2 ... ny y y≤ ≤ ≤ , such that the highest income in population M is lower than the lowest 
income in population N, namely 1mx y< . Thus, population M is relatively poor, whereas 
population N is relatively rich. We denote the mean incomes of populations M and N by 
Mµ  and Nµ , respectively. Obviously, M Nµ µ< . Then, we have the following claim. 
 
                                               
3 A commentator on an earlier version of this paper stated: “I think it is intuitive that if we combine 
populations, the resulting merged population will be more heterogeneous than the first ones.” As a matter 
of fact, the opposite holds. To see why intuition alone is not all that revealing, consider what is presumably 
the most intuitive measure of heterogeneity, namely the population variance: 
1
2 21 ( ) ,
n
i
i
x x
n
σ
=
= −∑  where 
1
1 n
i
i
x x
n =
= ∑ . The formula for 2σ  can be used even when the “randomness” of the observations is not well 
known, or even when we do not care much about the probabilistic nature of the observations - it simply can 
be used as a measure of spread (heterogeneity) among an arbitrarily given set of numbers. Then, we can 
think of the observations as a random variable which takes the values 1,..., nx x  with uniform probabilities 
1
n
. Given this, in the case of Scenario 3, the variance of income distribution {1,6}GI  is 6.25; the variance 
of income distribution {4,5}HI  is 0.25; and the variance of merged income distribution {1,4,5,6}G HI ∪  is 
3.5. That is, the variance of the merged population is smaller than the sum of the variances of the 
constituent populations when apart. This is exactly the opposite of the TRD result. 
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Claim 1: Denoting by M NTRD ∪  the total relative deprivation of the merged population of 
M and N, ( ) .N M NMM N
mn nTRDmTRDTRD
m n m n m n
µ µ
∪
−
= + +
+ + +
 
 
Proof: From the assumption that 1yxm < , we know that the individuals from N do not 
feel relatively deprived of incomes of the individuals in M. Using this fact, and the 
definition of TRD in (2), we have that 
             
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
m m n n m n
M N j i l k k i
i j i k l k i k
TRD x x y y y x
m n
− −
∪
= = + = = + = =
# $
= − + − + −% &+ ' (
∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ .             (6) 
The first two double sums in (6) are clearly MmTRD  and NnTRD , respectively, whereas 
the third double sum in (6) is that part of the TRD of the poorer population M which 
arises from the comparisons with the richer population N. We know that 
 1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .
m n m n m
k i k i N i
i k i k i
m
N i N M
i
y x y nx n x
n m x mn
µ
µ µ µ
= = = = =
=
− = − = −
= − = −
∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
 (7) 
Thus, from inserting (7) into (6), we get that 
[ ] ( )1 .N MM N M N
mnTRD mTRD nTRD
m n m n
µ µ
∪
−
= + +
+ +
 
From inspection of the expression of M NTRD ∪  in Claim 1, we get that M NTRD ∪  is 
higher the larger is ( )N Mµ µ− , and, for a given aggregate size m n+ , the larger is m  (n) 
if M NTRD TRD>  ( N MTRD TRD> ). These results are intuitively appealing: the farther 
apart the constituent populations on average, the larger the increase in TRD upon a 
merger; and the larger the relative size of the constituent population with the higher TRD, 
the larger the increase in the TRD of the merged population.  
 
6.2 The TRD when populations of any type (overlapping or non-overlapping) merge 
We next relax the assumption that the two populations do not necessarily overlap. As 
before, we have population M of m individuals, and population N of n individuals, and 
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the income distributions in the two populations are given, respectively, by 1 2 ... mx x x≤ ≤ ≤  
and 1 2 ... ny y y≤ ≤ ≤ . However, we now allow for the possibility that the highest income in 
population M, mx , is higher than the lowest income in population N, 1y . We then have 
the following claim. 
 
Claim 2: Denoting by M NTRD ∪  the total relative deprivation of the merged population of 
M and N, 1 1
| |
.
m n
i k
i k NM
M N
x y
nTRDmTRDTRD
m n m n m n
= =
∪
−
= + +
+ + +
∑∑
 
 
Proof: In order to prove the claim, we first rewrite TRD  in a form that allows for a nicer 
mathematical treatment. 
 
Lemma 1: Let a population M  of m  individuals with incomes 1 ... mx x≤ ≤  be given. 
Then,  
1 1
1
2
m m
M k i
k i
TRD x x
m = =
= −∑∑ . (8) 
Proof of Lemma 1: For all , 1, ,i k m=  either 0k ix x− ≥ , or 0i kx x− ≥ . TRD in (2) 
includes only non-negative differences between incomes in a distribution. Because the 
TRD in (8) includes the absolute values of all the differences between incomes, it counts 
a difference between a pair of given incomes twice.  
 Thus, we have that 
 
1
1 1 1 1
1 12 ( )
m m m m
k i k i
i k i k i
x x x x
m m
−
= = = = +
− = −∑∑ ∑∑ . (9) 
Inserting (9) into (2), we obtain (8).  □ 
 
We now use Lemma 1 to prove the claim. We consider how TRD  “behaves” upon the 
merging of two populations that may overlap. Using (8), we have that 
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( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2
2
m m n n m n
M N j i l k i k
i j k l i k
TRD x x y y x y
n m∪ = = = = = =
" #
= − + − + −% &+ ' (
∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ . (10) 
The first two double sums in (10) are clearly 2 MmTRD  and 2 NnTRD , respectively. We 
therefore have that  
[ ]
1 1
1 1 .
m n
M N M N i k
i k
TRD mTRD nTRD x y
m n m n∪ = =
= + + −
+ + ∑∑  
 
7. Comparing the TRD of a merged population with the sum of the TRDs of the 
constituent populations when apart 
7.1 The relationship between the TRD of a merged population and the sum of the 
TRDs of any two constituent populations of two individuals each  
We next seek to show that the merger of two populations each consisting of two 
individuals results in the TRD of the merged population being higher than the sum of the 
TRDs of the constituent populations. This is not an intuitively obvious result even in the 
simple case in which the two populations do not overlap and a relatively poor two-
individual population merges with a relatively rich two-individual population. In such a 
case, it is quite clear that upon integration the individuals from the poorer population are 
subjected to more relative deprivation, whereas (assuming that the incomes of the two 
rich individuals differ) the individuals from the richer population, except the richest, are 
subjected to less relative deprivation. Because one constituent population experiences an 
increase in TRD while the other constituent population experiences a decrease, whether 
the TRD of the merged population is higher than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent 
populations cannot be ascertained without additional formal analysis. To this end, we 
now state and prove the following claim.  
 
Claim 3: Let there be two populations of two individuals each: population A, and 
population B. Let the incomes of the four individuals be distinct. A merger of the two 
populations results in an increase of TRD, that is, A B A BTRD TRD TRD∪ > + . 
 
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
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Corollary: In the degenerate case in which the incomes of population A are identical to 
the incomes of population B, A B A BTRD TRD TRD∪ = + .  
 
Proof: When the incomes of population A are identical to the incomes of population B, 
merging the two populations is equivalent to doubling the number of income recipients of 
each income. Without loss of generality, let each of the two populations consist of two 
individuals with incomes 1 and 1 α+ , where 0α > . Because TRD is a measure with 
homogeneity of degree one, it follows that  
{1,1,1 ,1 } {2 1,2 (1 )} 2 {1,1 } .A B A BTRD TRD TRD TRD TRD TRDα α α α∪ = + + = × × + = + = +  
Scenario 1 considered in Section 5 constitutes such a case. 
 
7.2 The relationship between the TRD of a merged population and the sum of the 
TRDs of two possibly overlapping constituent populations of the same number of 
individuals, n, for any n ≥ 2 
Scenario 3 demonstrated that the merger of a relatively poor (in terms of income per 
capita) two-individual population with a relatively rich (in terms of income per capita) 
two-individual population when the two populations overlap results in a TRD of the 
merged population that is higher than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations. 
Drawing on Claim 2, we next show that the merging of equally-sized overlapping 
populations (or, for that matter, non-overlapping populations) results in a TRD of the 
merged population that is higher than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations 
- a generalization of Claim 3. To this end, we first state and prove the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: Let u v≤  and r s≤  be real numbers. Then, 
 | | | | ( ) ( ).u s v r v u s r− + − ≥ − + −  (11) 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Given that u v≤  and r s≤ , there are six possible orderings of these 
numbers. We consider each case separately. 
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1. u v r s≤ ≤ ≤ . Then, 
| | | | ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u s v r s u s r r v v u v u s r− + − ≥ − = − + − + − ≥ − + − . The case where 
r s u v≤ ≤ ≤  follows by symmetry. 
2. u r v s≤ ≤ ≤ . Then, | | | | ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u s v r s u v r v u s r− + − = − + − = − + − . The case where 
r u s v≤ ≤ ≤  follows by symmetry. 
3. u r s v≤ ≤ ≤ . Then, | | | | ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u s v r s u v r v u s r− + − = − + − = − + − . The case where 
r u v s≤ ≤ ≤  follows by symmetry.  
 
We now use Lemma 2 to prove the following claim. 
 
Claim 4: Let there be two populations, M and N, with the same number of individuals in 
each population. Then, NMNM TRDTRDTRD +≥∪ .  
 
Proof: Let there be n individuals in each population, let the incomes of the individuals in 
M be 1 ... nx x≤ ≤ , and let the incomes of the individuals in N be 1 ... ny y≤ ≤ . From (2) we 
know that  
1
1 1
1 ( )
n n
M k i
i k i
TRD x x
n
−
= = +
= −∑ ∑  
and, similarly, that 
1
1 1
1 ( ) .
n n
N k i
i k i
TRD y y
n
−
= = +
= −∑ ∑  
From Claim 2 we also get that 
 
1 1
1 1( ) | | .
2 2
n n
M N M N i k
i k
TRD TRD TRD x y
n∪ = =
= + + −∑∑  (12) 
Drawing on Lemma 2 with i kx x≤  and i ky y≤ , and leaving out the terms with i=k, we 
have that 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1| | (| | | |) [( ) ( )].
2 2 2
n n n n n n
i k i k k i k i k i
i k i k i i k i
x y x y x y x x y y
n n n
− −
= = = = + = = +
− ≥ − + − ≥ − + −∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑  (13) 
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The most right hand side term in (13) is equal to 1 ( )
2 M N
TRD TRD+ . Thus, we have that 
 
1 1
1 1| | ( )
2 2
n n
i k M N
i k
x y TRD TRD
n = =
− ≥ +∑∑ . (14) 
Upon inserting (14) into (12), we get that  
.M N M NTRD TRD TRD∪ ≥ +  
 
7.3 The relationship between the TRD of a merged population and the sum of the 
TRDs of two non-overlapping constituent populations of different numbers of 
individuals 
Claim 5: Let there be two populations, M of m individuals with incomes 
1 2 mx x x≤ ≤ ≤ , and N of n individuals with incomes 1 2m m m nx x x+ + +≤ ≤ ≤ , such that 
1m mx x +< . Then, M N M NTRD TRD TRD∪ > + . 
 
Proof: Upon a merger of M and N, there will be a population M N∪  with incomes 
1 2 1 2{ , , , , , , , }m m m m nx x x x x x+ + + . We seek to show that  
 
1 1
12 2 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
( ) ( )
m n m
m m m n m nj i
j m ij i j i
i j i i m j i
M N
m m m n m n
j i j i
i j i i m j i
M N
x x
mn x x mn x xm n
n mTRD
m n mn m n mn m n mn
n m n x x m m n x x
TRD TRD
m n mn m n mn
+
− + − +
= + =
= = + = + = +
∪
− + − +
= = + = + = +
− −−
= + +
+ + +
+ − + −
> + = +
+ +
∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
 (15) 
where the three terms in the first row of (15) are M NTRD ∪  decomposed in line with Claim 
1, and the two terms in the second row of (15) are MTRD  and NTRD , respectively, with 
all five terms reduced to a common denominator. From (7), we know that  
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
m n m
j i m m n
j m i
j i
i j m
x x
mn x x
n m
+
+
= + =
= = +
− = −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑  . 
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Thus, seeking to show that (15) holds is equivalent to seeking to show that  
 
1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
m m n m m m n m n
j i j i j i
i j m i j i i m j i
mn x x n x x m x x
+ − + − +
= = + = = + = + = +
Φ = − − − − − >∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ . (16) 
It is easy to see that 
1
2 1 3 1 1
1 1
3 2 2
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ),
m m
j i m
i j i
m
m m
x x x x x x x x
x x x x
x x
−
= = +
−
− = − + − + + −
+ − + + −
+ −
∑ ∑
 
or that 
 
1
1 3 2
1 1
1 2 2 1
1 2 1
( )=( 1) ( 2) 2
( 1) ( 2) 2
( 1) ( 3) (3 ) (1 ) ,
m m
j i m m
i j i
m m
m m
x x m x m x x x
m x m x x x
m x m x m x m x
−
−
= = +
− −
−
− − + − + + +
− − − − − − −
= − + − + + − + −
∑ ∑
 (17) 
and that  
 
1 1 2 1 1
1 1
1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ).
m m n
j i m m m n
i j m
m m m n
m m m m m n m
m m m n m
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
m x x x n x x x
+
+ + +
= = +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
− = − + − + + −
+ − + − + + −
+ − + − + + −
= + + + − + + +
∑ ∑
 (18) 
Using (17) for the second and third terms in (16), and (18) for the first term in (16), we 
can then rewrite (16) as  
2 2
1 2 1 2
2
1 2 1
2
1 2 1
( ) ( )
[( 1) ( 3) (3 ) (1 ) ]
[( 1) ( 3) (3 ) (1 ) ] 0,
m m m n m
m m
m n m n m m
m n x x x mn x x x
n m x m x m x m x
m n x n x n x n x
+ + +
−
+ + − + +
Φ = + + + − + + +
− − + − + + − + −
− − + − + + − + − >
 
or, after rearranging, as 
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2
1 2 1
2
1 2 1
2
1 1 1 1
2
2 2 2 2
1
[ 3 (2 3) (2 1) ]
[(2 1) (2 3) 3 ]
[ 3 (2 3) (2 1) ]
[(2 1) (2 3) 3 ]
0.
m n m n m m
m m
m m m m
m m m m
m m
m x x n x n x
n m x m x x x
m x x n x n x
n m x m x x x
m n x m n x
+ + − + +
−
+ + + +
+
Φ = + + + − + −
− − + − + + +
≥ + + + − + −
− − + − + + +
= − >
 
 
8. Social welfare implications  
Making comparisons of social welfare is notoriously difficult. Still, with the aid of simple 
auxiliary assumptions, we are able to assess the welfare repercussions of the merger of 
populations. In general, to render a welfare judgement, it is necessary to identify what to 
compare, and how to measure it. In what follows, we compare the social welfare, SW, of 
each constituent population following integration with the social welfare experienced by 
the population prior to integration. We assume that the SW of a population is a function 
of per capita income and of per capita TRD (per capita social stress), with the partial first 
derivates being, respectively, positive and negative. Because throughout we have kept 
incomes unchanged, the incomes of the individuals of a constituent population are not 
affected by its merger with another population and, hence, (as there is neither population 
growth nor population decline), the per capita income of every individual of a constituent 
population remains unchanged. This point is worth reiterating: in our setting, a merger 
changes the space of social comparisons that governs the sensing and calculation of 
relative income (relative deprivation), but it leaves absolute incomes intact. Thus, the 
integration-caused change in the SW of a constituent population is related only to the 
change in per capita TRD. In the following comparisons of changes in the SW upon 
integration, we consider TRD in total (not in per capita terms) because the number of 
individuals in each constituent population remains unchanged.  
 We first study the SW repercussions of each of the three scenarios presented in 
Section 5. Thereafter, we provide several generalizations. 
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8.1 The three scenarios, and a little beyond 
In Scenario 1, the TRD of population A after the merger is the same as it was prior to the 
merger, namely 1
2AA A A B
TRD TRD∈ ∪ = = . And likewise with regard to population B. We 
conclude that social welfare remains intact. 
In Scenario 2, integration with population D with income distribution { }4,4DI  
exposes individuals of population C with income distribution {1,2}CI  to higher TRD: 
11 1
4 2CC C C D
TRD TRD∈ ∪ = > = . Thus, population C experiences a decline in SW. The SW of 
population D remains unchanged at 0 upon the merger. We conclude that integration 
entails a reduction in social welfare. 
In Scenario 3, integration exposes each of the two constituent populations (with 
income distributions { }1,6GI , and { }4,5HI ) to higher TRD: 
3 4 5 53
4 4 4 2GGG G H
TRD TRD∈ ∪ = + + = > = ; 
3 1 11
4 4 2HH H G H
TRD TRD∈ ∪ = + = > = . We 
conclude that in this case too, integration entails a reduction in social welfare. 
Taking a clue from these three scenarios, we can generalize intuitively as follows: 
when there are two populations, say M and N, of two individuals each, it can never be the 
case that there is a universal welfare gain, namely that the TRDs of both populations are 
lowered upon a merger: either the TRDs of both populations remain unchanged (as in 
Scenario 1), or the TRD of at least one population increases (as in Scenarios 2 and 3).  
Ruling out the case in which all the incomes in N are identical, when populations M 
and N do not overlap and, without loss of generality, M is relatively poorer, a merger 
must reduce the TRD of N. The converse applies to population M.  
When populations M and N overlap, then, without loss of generality, either M 
mingles with N, or it is “immersed” en bloc in N (as in Scenario 3). Regarding the first 
case, that is, if 1 2{ , }MI x x , 1 2{ , }NI y y , and the sequence is 1 1 2 2x y x y< < < , then, as is 
easy to ascertain, the TRD of population M upon a merger, namely |M M M NTRD ∈ ∪ , must be 
higher than the TRD of population M prior to the merger, and the TRD of population N 
upon a merger, namely |N N M NTRD ∈ ∪ , must be lower than the TRD of population N prior 
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to the merger.4 To wit, given the sequence as above, 1 1 2 2x y x y< < < , it can never be the 
case that both populations record a decrease in their TRDs. 
An analogous analysis of changes in TRDs experienced by two populations in the 
wake of integration when one is “immersed” en bloc in the other,5 leads to the claim that 
a merger of two populations of two individuals each can never confer a universal social 
welfare gain upon both populations.  
The preceding discussion leads us to the following generalizations. 
 
8.2 A change in social welfare following merger when each of the merged 
populations consists of two or more individuals  
8.2.1 Non-overlapping populations 
When the merger is of any two populations M and N that do not overlap (by “any” we 
mean that the size of M is 2m ≥ , and that the size of N is 2n ≥ ) such that, without loss 
of generality, M is relatively poorer (and ruling out the case in which all the incomes in N 
are identical), a merger must reduce the TRD of N, namely it lowers N’s social stress; 
consequently, this population experiences a social welfare gain. The converse applies to 
population M. In the general non-overlapping case then, and unlike in the three scenarios 
considered, we might not be able to end up with an unequivocal global welfare judgment 
because one population gains while the other loses, and it is not up to us to assign weights 
to these contrasting changes. However, if we make a global welfare judgment on the 
                                               
4 Formally, assume that the incomes of population M are 1 and 1 a b+ + , while the incomes of population N 
are 1 a+  and 1 a b c+ + + , where a, b and c are arbitrary positive constants. Then, 
|
3 2 2 2 2
4 4 2M M M N M
a b c a b a bTRD TRD∈ ∪
+ + + +
= > = = , namely upon a merger there is an increase in the 
social stress of population M. At the same time, population N experiences a post-merger decrease in social 
stress: |
2 2 2
4 4 2N N M N N
b c b c b cTRD TRD∈ ∪
+ + +
= < = = . 
5 Denote the incomes of population M as 1 a+  and 1 a b+ + , and the incomes of population N as 1 and 
1 a b c+ + + , where a, b and c are arbitrary positive constants. Then, |
2 2
4M M M N
b cTRD ∈ ∪
+
=   
2
4 2 M
b b TRD> = = , namely upon a merger there is an increase in the social stress of population M. The 
social welfare repercussions of the merger for population N cannot be assessed easily, because they depend 
on the differences between the incomes of the individuals of both populations. Prior to the merger 
2 2 2
2 4N
a b c a b cTRD + + + += = , whereas following the merger |
3 2
4N N M N
a b cTRD ∈ ∪
+ +
= .                        
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basis of a comparison of the TRD of the merged population with the sum of the TRDs of 
the constituent populations and assign equal weights in the sum of the TRDs of the two 
populations to each of the TRDs of the constituent populations, then we have the 
following claim.  
 
Claim 6: The SW of two non-overlapping constituent populations under a merger is lower 
than the sum of the SWs of the constituent populations when apart. 
 
Proof: Cf. the proof of Claim 5.   
 
8.2.2 Overlapping populations 
The study of the case in which populations M and N overlap is more difficult. Still, we 
can make some headway. 
 
Claim 7: The following statement is false: “when the merger is of two overlapping 
populations, both populations experience a welfare gain”. 
 
Proof: The proof is by example, cf. Scenario 3. 
 
Claim 8: When the merger is of two overlapping populations of the same size, it is never 
the case that both populations experience a welfare gain.  
 
Proof: If both populations were to experience a welfare gain, then it would have to be the 
case that M N M NTRD TRD TRD∪ < + . But from Claim 4 we know that the opposite holds, 
that is, that NMNM TRDTRDTRD +≥∪ .    
If, akin to the case of non-overlapping populations discussed in Section 8.2.1 that 
led to Claim 6, we were to make a global welfare judgment on the basis of a comparison 
of the TRD of the merged population with the sum of the TRDs of the constituent 
populations and maintain a stand of cross-population impartiality (neutrality), that is, 
assign equal weights to each of the TRDs of the constituent populations in the sum of the 
TRDs of the two populations, then we will have the following claim.  
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Claim 9: The SW of the two constituent populations of the same number of individuals 
under a merger is lower than or equal to the sum of the SWs of the constituent 
populations when apart. 
 
Proof: Cf. the proof of Claim 4.   
 
9. Conclusion  
As already noted in Section 1, mergers of populations occur in all spheres of life, and in 
all times and places. Mergers may arise as a result of administrative considerations or 
naturally, they may be imposed or chosen by election. A merger of populations is a far 
cry from the merger of production lines. The social environment and the social horizons 
that the individuals who constitute the merged population face change fundamentally 
upon a merger: others who were previously outside the individuals’ social domain are 
now within. One consequence of this revision of the social landscape, which hitherto 
appears not to have received due attention, is a built-in increase in social stress: in a rich 
variety of settings, we have shown that the TRD of a merged population is larger than the 
sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations when apart. As a consequence, 
integration can fail to reward the populace with a sense of improved wellbeing and 
damage social harmony in quite unexpected ways.   
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Appendix 
Proof of Claim 3: With all incomes distinct (pairwise different) we assume, without loss 
of generality, that the smallest income is 1 and that it is obtained in population A. Thus, 
the incomes in population A are 
1, 1+α, 
and the incomes in population B are 
1+β, 1+ β + δ, 
where , , 0α β δ >  are arbitrary. Clearly, 
2A
TRD α= , and 
2B
TRD δ= . 
To evaluate the TRD of the four-individual population C with incomes 
1,1 ,1 ,1a a b a b c+ + + + + +  
and with arbitrary , , 0a b c > , we note, referring to the four individuals as (1), (2), (3), and 
(4), that 
1 1(1) [ ( ) ( )], (2) [ ( )], (3) , (4) 0.
4 4 4
cRD a a b a b c RD b b c RD RD= + + + + + = + + = =  
Therefore, 
 1(1) (2) (3) (3 4 3 )
4C
TRD RD RD RD a b c= + + = + + . (A1) 
We now consider the TRD of A B∪ . Depending on the relative magnitudes of 
, ,α β δ  we have three cases: α β< ; β α β δ< < + ; and α β δ> + . We attend to the 
second case; the proof of the other two cases is analogous. 
When β α β δ< < + , we have that α β ε= +  for some 0ε > . Consequently, we 
arrange the incomes as 
1,1 ,1 ,1 ( ),β β ε β ε δ ε+ + + + + + −  
and we note, because β δ α+ > , that 0δ ε− > . Using this and (A1),  
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1 1[3 4 3( )] (3 2 2 ) .
4 4 2 2 2 2A B A B
TRD TRD TRDβ ε δ α δβ ε δ ε β ε δ∪
+
= + + − > + + > + = + = +  
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